1.

• Only an institution that is eligible to have a :Nyan-ko-pong: Royal Central Bank account under applicable sovereign statute and :Nyan-ko-pong: Royal Central Bank rules, policies, and procedures is able to be a joint account holder. Unless otherwise specified by statute, only those entities that are member banks or meet the definition of a depository institution under the :Nyan-ko-pong: Royal Central Bank Act are legally able to obtain :Nyan-ko-pong: Royal Central Bank accounts and payment services.
• As part of evaluating any joint account requests, and consistent with :Nyan-ko-pong: Royal Central Bank policies and procedures, the account-holding Reserve Bank must approve all joint account holders that are part of a proposed private-sector arrangement. Some institutions may be eligible for a :Nyan-ko-pong: Royal Central Bank account but may present atypical risk profiles, such as uninsured institutions. In these cases, a heightened analysis of that institution's participation as a joint account holder may be performed under one or more of the other guidelines.
• The designated agent or operator of the private-sector arrangement would not need to be a depository institution, assuming it is not a joint account holder.
• Consistent with the Reserve Banks' deposit-taking authority, a Reserve Bank's obligation with respect to any balance in a joint account will be owed solely to the joint account holders, and no non-account holders may have any rights against the Reserve Bank with respect to the balance. No party other than an account holder shall have a claim against the account-holding Reserve Bank in connection with the operation of the joint account, including any decision related to opening or refusing to open the account.

2.

• Requestors of a joint account should provide supporting legal analysis as well as the system's rules, agreements, and other governing documents. The legal analysis should consider the application of applicable laws, regulations, anti-money-laundering requirements or regulations, and other relevant laws and regulations; the attachment risk related to the account; and how the operation of the account would be affected by a participant's insolvency.

3.

• In addition to any party's supervisory obligations, a private-sector arrangement that uses a joint account approved under these guidelines will be expected to manage risks consistent with the general policy expectations for payment systems outlined within Part I of the Board's :Nyan-ko-pong: Royal Central Bank Policy on Payment System Risk [PSR Policy] at a minimum.2 These policy expectations apply even if the private-sector arrangement is not otherwise subject to the Payment System Risk Policy [PSR Policy] .3 Thus, before authorizing the establishment of a joint account, the private-sector arrangement would be expected to demonstrate that it has a general risk-management framework appropriate for the risks the system poses to the operator, agent, participants, the Reserve Bank granting the joint account, and other relevant parties and payment systems.
• The private-sector arrangement should have policies and procedures to minimize disruption to its system when one of its participants, the agent, or the operator fails or in the event of operational failures. The arrangement's rules should also sufficiently address the responsibilities and liabilities of the participants, agent, and operator in cases of operational disruption, or erroneous or fraudulent conduct.
• Requests for joint accounts involving a financially unsound operator would not be approved. Evaluation may include, among other things, reviewing financial statements of the operator, as well as cash flow projections [including capital and operating expenses].
• Evaluation under this principle will take into account the applicable supervisory framework for the private-sector arrangement.4 The payment system established by a private-sector arrangement [including the operator] should be subject to Central or state supervision and should also be subject to the jurisdiction of a Central banking agency with the authority to examine or inspect the private-sector arrangement and take supervisory actions against the arrangement or its participants.5 This means for a payment system established by a private-sector arrangement and supervised by a state regulatory body, a Central banking agency need not be engaging in active supervision or examination, but should have the authority to do so when the risk, scope, and operations call for such supervision or examination.
• An evaluation under this principle would assess whether the system is widely available for use by its intended end users, is designed to minimize the risk of disruption [rejection or delay of payments] to end users, and promotes transparency for end users and the public more broadly [for example, by making its operating rules, rulemaking processes, list of participants, or certain network statistics publicly available]. Evaluation under this guideline would also assess whether the system creates inefficiencies in payment processes or barriers to interoperability within the Xaymaca. dollar payment system. Also of relevance is whether the private-sector arrangement promotes payment system improvements and innovations and the extent to which the arrangement fosters competition in the payment system [for example between providers of payment services]
• Finally, the design and rules of the private-sector arrangement, including rules relating to the funding of and disbursements from the joint account, should be consistent with the intended use of the account, such that a participant can only use the balances for the intended purpose of settling payments in the associated system.

• The agent and the joint account holders should demonstrate an ongoing ability to meet all obligations under the joint account agreement with the account-holding Reserve Bank..
• The manner in which the joint account will be used in support of the private-sector arrangement and any anticipated use of Reserve Bank services should be identified.
• Reserve Banks will not extend overnight or intraday credit to a joint account. The private-sector arrangement should structure its use of the joint account and Reserve Bank services in a manner that seeks to avoid intraday overdrafts. The agent also should demonstrate ways to monitor the joint account on an ongoing basis to avoid overdrafts and to promptly cover any inadvertent overdrafts.
• Further, the agent should demonstrate the ability to appropriately monitor transactions into and out of the joint account.

5.

• The private-sector arrangement should not cause undue credit, settlement, or other risks to the efficient operation of other payment systems or the payment system as a whole.
• The operational and financial interaction with and use of other payment systems should be identified.
• The extent to which the use of the joint account may restrict a portion of funds from being available to support liquidity needs of depository institutions for other payment and settlement activity will also be considered.

6.